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Can democratic Muslims defeat intolerance? – Airlangga Pribadi Kusman

February 27, 2016

Maurizio Geri of Old Dominion University, Norfolk, the US, wrote in The Jakarta Post on January 20 about the battle to defeat the Islamic State (Isis) movement in Indonesia. Brimming with optimism, he stated that the inclusive and tolerant character of Muslims in Indonesia could be considered a potential "diamond" in the battle of ideas against Isis.

The "diamond" is an asset apparently not available in other Muslim-majority countries. It is true that the inclusivity and tolerance of Indonesian Islam, also referred to as Islam Nusantara, has stronger democratic features than Islamic discourse in other predominantly Muslim states.

However, Geri does not consider the problem of involution in Indonesian democracy, which is also due to the pragmatic character of the Indonesian political arena and the failure of democratic Muslim groups to consolidate a proper base in grassroots politics.

The optimistic socio-cultural perspective about the tolerant character of Indonesian Muslims overlooks the new trend of intolerance in local politics. The macro picture of this pluralist character, which was famously called by Robert W. Hefner (2000) as "civil Islam", misses the political processes that are informed by social discrimination and endorsed by some fanatics and the local elites who support them.

There are several recent examples of this. First, the expulsion of Ahmadis from Bangka, which was endorsed by the Bangka mayor, Tarmizi, who secured the public post with support from the nationalist-oriented Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).

Second, the expulsion of Shiites from Sampang, Madura, East Java, and the legal restrictions set on Ahmadiyah by the decree issued by East Java governor Sukarwo from nationalist-oriented Democratic Party.

Third, the discrimination against religious minority groups in Bogor that is maintained by mayor Bima Arya Sugiarto, a PhD from the Australian National University and former teacher at Paramadina University, which is a prominent advocate of inclusiveness and tolerance.

The alliances between religious fanatic groups and political elites coming from pluralist-nationalist parties, show that political efforts to fight Isis and intolerance should start from the socio-political level.

The temptation of the nationalist political elites to support fanatics also demonstrates the weak capacity of moderate Muslim groups to neutralise intolerant policies.

The assessment of the capacity of Indonesia to anticipate religious radicalisation cannot be based solely on the framework of good Muslims versus bad Muslims. The Indonesian social realm shows that the presence of good pluralist Muslims does not automatically guarantee the flourishing of civic values.

To evaluate the dynamics of religious intolerance we should consider the political structure of post-authoritarian Indonesia. Decentralisation and transparency in governance still cannot overcome the predatory networks that try to hijack local resources and public authority for their own interests.

There have been indications of malpractice with regard to the local budget in the case of Lahan Jambu area in Bogor and the allegations of corruption in Bangka at the local government level. When the local statecraft is in crisis, political elites struggle to sustain their power and consolidate support in their constituencies.

Therefore, some of them, despite their pluralist orientation, try to win over the hearts of the public through conservative moral sentiment and divert public scrutiny of their socio-economic and corruption issues.

The emergence of religious intolerance can also be seen from the perspective of a failure of the Muslim democrats to consolidate grassroots support. As stated by Walter Benjamin during the emergence of fascism in Germany in the 1930s, the emergence of fascist politics is an index of the absence of emancipatory politics.

In the case of Indonesian politics, the fall of Soeharto in 1998, did not automatically annihilate the social alliances that formed under his protection. The New Order alliances did not only adapt to the new circumstances, but have also been able to forge new alliances and dominate the political arena.

This political configuration has resulted in the relative absence of genuine liberal or progressive groups that could create strong social bases in order to intervene in the political arena.

The absence of authentic democratic forces in both secular or religious groups has allowed the growth of fanatic populists, who historically emerge from the military and can develop their power and capacity in order to grasp the hearts and minds of ordinary people.

The involution of democratic Muslims' performance in the post-authoritarian era does not automatically counter the important aspect of pluralism and tolerance of Indonesian Islam. However, the optimistic view should be balanced by a cautious analysis and self-criticism. Back to the question of whether democratic Muslims can defeat intolerance in Indonesia?

The answer is yes, if they can create a strong democratic base to support their agenda and consolidate their power at the grassroots level. The struggle is not only to fight against intolerance, but also to strengthen our democracy. – Jakarta Post, February 27, 2016.

* Airlangga Pribadi Kusman teaches at the School of Political Science, Airlangga University, Surabaya.

* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insider.