Arab Spring and post-Islamism?

FEB 17 — Whatever the terms “Arab Spring” vis-a-vis “Islamists” might mean to readers, not many understand its full import. This article aims to look at the political trajectory of Islamists, post-Arab Spring.

Granted, the Arab Sring is now chronicled in various ways by both deserving victors and eyewitness account of observant bystanders. Their writings now compete for space in the on-going Cairo book fair commemorating the first anniversary of the city’s revolution.

Arab Spring is a singular phenomenon in the history of the world. Yes, it is the first revolution without an apparent consummate leader(s). Its genesis was in the social media, which then went viral and triggered a cascade of uprisings that finally ousted despots in decades-old regimes once deemed as unshakeable as the Pyramids.

The clarion call was for social justice, dignity and democracy. From Tunisia, it reverberated far and wide to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. Now, it is raging in Syria.

The message, bluntly put, is “Enough and No to Dictators”. Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Husni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi and, very recently, Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, all ended their despotic regime in extremely disgraceful ways.

Fast forward to the present. Like the Tunisians and the Moroccans, the Egyptian electorate has given a handsome mandate to the “Islamists” in their general election. Their brethren in Libya are anxiously waiting for their dream of expressing their democratic rights in a free and fair general election.

But why give their mandate to the “Islamists” — these selfless souls and their respective organisations, which, admittedly more than others, have long endured untold miseries in the hands of the various despots?

As if it is now a payback of sorts, their victories over many other competing parties spoke well of the high expectation placed on them to bring in justice, fairness and prosperity for all.

But most paradoxically, despite — or, arguably, because of — these electoral victories, the “Islamists” shall become, or perhaps already have, become the first “victim” of their own success. You must be wondering why.

Well, described as the “current dilemma” of the Islamists, Dr Tariq Ramadzan, a contemporary global Islamic thinker, opined that there is a sure and significant shift, of Islamists steering away from the ideological objective of establishing an Islamic State. But to the Islamists, the choice of embracing liberal democracy has never been an option before and surely not now. So why, then, the dilemma?

Retrospectively speaking, the Islamic state has all along been unflinchingly advocated by Islamists of diverse persuasions. It was almost the be-all and end-all of their struggle. The avowed aim has always been to reinstate the political and social unity of the Muslim ummah and its cultural heritage, immediately after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate.

The structure of the Islamic state was frequently conceptualised in the light of Islamic principles (as drawn up by the classical Sunni and Shi’ite traditions) and articulated around the core concept and implementation of “Islamic law”, meaning the concept of Syariah, ostensibly the punitive aspects of the Islamic Law.

Unfortunately, the notion of an “Islamic state” has always been stigmatised by its cumbersome baggage and negative connotations. Not least is the perception that it’s theocratic and undemocratic, as it conjures imposition of religious authority — speaking on behalf of God — on a democratically mandated government of the people.

Herein lies the bone of contention. Again, Islamists have often been accused of, or, at best, perceived as always being adamant in implementing its truth and dogma over the democratic state.

Democracy, on the other hand, is invariably seen as being at loggerhead with the Islamists, as it attempts to empower the legislative process through elected representatives as well as being a means to express and realise the will of the people.

But Shaikh Yousuf Al Qaradawi and Tunisian EnNahdah leader Rachid Gannouchi, both distinguished scholars, have consistently argued, for some time now, that democracy is not in contradiction with the idea of Islam as a political project.

Very recently, though, the Islamist leader of the Algerian Hamas party, Mahfoud Nahnah, appears to have been the first to no longer speak of an Islamic state, but of a civil state, as their political objective.

But it would not be fair if PAS in Malaysia and PKS in Indonesia are not accorded the credit that both have, in fact, “contextualised” the demands of the post-Arab Spring era well ahead of their Islamist counterparts in the Middle East.

Islamists have come to better appreciate and illustrate that the bigger agenda of “Government and Good Governance” to achieve “Prosperity for All” is indeed very Quranic (Hud: 61).

Islamists have now come to wage war against endemic corruption, abuse of power, usurpation of rights and fundamental liberty, crony capitalism and monopoly, as being fundamentally anti-Islam and grossly against humanity.

This ideological emphasis has now taken precedence over the once “narrow” interpretation of Islamic law that merely stresses on the “punitive aspect of the Islamic law” epitomised by hudud. That simplistic “legal reductionism” has, in fact, very regrettably put Islamists in a bad light for many decades.

In the same strides, Islamists have also come to understand that their political legitimacy and religious authority must be fought, won and established through political contestation within the ambit of the electoral process.

Much as they would rejoice in their victories, Islamists are now resigned to the fact that they could very well lose their mandate should their political offerings, policy advocacy and performance fail to meet the expectations and hopes of the citizenry and the electorate.

Hence, they have come to terms with the fact that the operative decision-making process requires that its authority be civil in nature, as the civil state must administer majority preferences through the categories of “right or wrong”, in full recognition of the plurality of religions and political contestation of ideas and policies.

But does this make them less Islamist now? Does this constitute an ideological dilution of sorts?

Islamists now seem certain that their shift is conscious and, indeed, warranted by Islam. Certainly, their embracing of democracy, particularly of the principle of “checks and balances” and “management of constructive dissent”, found its premise in the Islamic precept as enshrined in the Holy Quran (verse 2:251).

Islam enjoins and advocates the “intense political contestation” as a cardinal principle of effective governance in establishing the ultimate purpose of justice and attaining human dignity. To that end, Islam equally stresses on accountability, transparency and rule of law as safeguards against the subversion of nationhood, the state institutions and its citizenry.

But lest we are of the idea that Islamists are about to debunk and forsake their ideological convictions and should now wholeheartedly embrace liberal democracy, this writer, an Islamist democrat himself, wishes to be outright in stating his position.

Yes, Islamists are experiencing a transition. But the notion of post-Islamism, as mooted by some scholars of “Political Islam” like Professor Oliver Roy, is, however, precarious; just as it is loaded and dangerous when he compares it with the western experience, i.e. much like the socialist parties in Europe abandoning Marxism at some point in the 1970-80s.

If post-Islamism is meant to imply a movement that reconciles liberal democracy and Islam, as alluded by this French scholar and thinker, it surely will invite serious critique from not only the hardliners of Political Islam, but perhaps from all Islamists.

While quite willingly embracing an era of “Post-Arab Spring” and, for lack of a better term, “Islamism-Plus”, to denote the various forms of Islamic activism after the downfall of Ottoman Empire and post-Colonialism, Islamists are surely passing a “generational shift” in their political history.

Global Islamist thinkers must not allow this void to be filled by narratives of Political Islam as advocated by their western counterparts.

Given the vastness of the Maqaasid of Syariah (Purpose of the Syariah) and the provision of Intellectual Renewal (Al-Ijtihad) in Islam, this writer has always advocated a creative and brave new Muslim Scholarship in Political Islam to better grasp current and future challenges in the realm of political contestation and public policy advocacy.

Islamists should now engage the world as a critical player and actor in political contestation, alone as well as in collaboration with others. They must not be confined to only nation-rebuilding, but must commit to the loftier trajectory of a remaking human civilisation.

* The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the columnist.