The Illegitimate trio of multiculturalism, democracy and secularism

So what if we know that the root cause of our problem goes all the way back to the unresolved nation-building question in 1946? some ask. They want a solution, cut and dry.

Some others believe perhaps no solution is the only solution as time will take care of that.

To me, no solution can be possible unless we appreciate fully and calmly the problem, or at least the largest of its implications: the legitimate crisis suffered by multiculturalism, democracy and secularism.

An illegitimate trio

Multiculturalism, democracy and secularism are illegitimate because they are seen as the post-colonial new political order imposed on the indigenous population.

In other words, Malaysia – or subconsciously, Tanah Melayu – would not have a multi-ethnic population, multiparty democracy and secular system if the British had not been here.

In the imagined pre-colonial Alam Melayu, the natives lived unexploited because everyone spoke Malay and professed Islam, and the Malay rulers benevolently protected their subjects.

Political order was governed by the notion of social contract laid down by the legendary Sang Utama Sri Tri Buana (the claimed ancestor of all Malay royalties) and Demang Lebar Daun who represented the subjects.

Embracing multiparty democracy and secularism would be psychologically difficult for two reasons.

First, it causes cognitive dissonance if you have all the while believed in a simplified anti-colonial discourse. 

Simply, if colonial rule is what caused the problem of multiculturalism, and the colonialists were here to exploit us, it is emotionally stressful to think that we owe something we appreciate today to these people we despise.

It requires minimally an appreciation of the idea of “unintended consequence”. 

At the most, it requires a sophisticated understanding of the global integration and modernisation process the world has been undergoing since Columbus’s return to Spain in 1493 after his first voyage to America.

The post-colonial order would be more accurately perceived as a “plural order” encompassing cultural-linguistic pluralism, political pluralism and religious pluralism, brought about by the post-1493 ongoing migration, transformation and integration of human groups.

Neither of these – the disconnection between intent and consequence, and a sophisticated modernisation discourse – works well for nationalist mobilisation among the indigenous population, which naturally values simplicity over sophistication and uniformity over heterogeneity.

Second, related to the first point and more importantly, both multiparty democracy and secularism normatively assume impartiality of the state, which would mean a shift from the 1957 compromises.

In other words, an impartial state is exactly antithetical to the intended Malay nation-state, a paradigm shared by Umno and its rivals for the Malay constituency notwithstanding the differences in conceptualisation and emphasis.

Selective support for and rejection of the plural order

By now, some would question: has there been a widespread and outright rejection of all three – multiculturalism, democracy and secularism?

The answer is certainly a categorical No. Otherwise, this discussion would have taken place decades ago and the 1946 question should have found its answer long ago.

Our national history is basically one of selective support for and rejection of the post-colonial order by different groups.

And some groups may not even have done it because of Malay nationalism at all. The partial undermining of the tri-element plural order is a multi-factored phenomenon even though the weight of Malay nationalism has been the heaviest.

To begin with, many liberals especially those educated in multi-ethnic English schools accept secularism and democracy but have strong misgivings about multiculturalism – once excluding religion, which really just means multilingualism and communal social networks.

Many of them still believe that a single-stream education using English and Malay as the main medium would be the solution to segregation and religious extremism. The more Anglicised ones would prefer an English-speaking secular society if possible.

And such belief for a melting pot nation should not surprise us as multiculturalism was slowly gaining ground only after 1970s, compared to the centuries-old notion of mono-cultural nation-state.

James Madison’s eloquent advocacy for diversity as a safeguard against tyranny – albeit in a socio-economic rather than cultural context – in his seminal Federalist No 10 is hardly heard of in our cultural debates.

Next to the “melting-pot” liberals are many Malay leftists who desire a population linguistically and culturally adequately Malaynised but who are fundamentally egalitarian. They are no big fans of Malay feudalism or Islamic theocracy. They believe in democracy too, albeit with a strong socialist flavour.

Many advocates of a melting pot nation may not realise that if lingo-cultural diversity is delegitimised, the legitimacy of political and religious pluralism can easily become the collateral damage.

The “moderation” of Umno and PAS

Further away from embracing the plural order are many Anglicised Malay conservative elites who love secularism but only tolerate democracy and multiculturalism insofar as they do not threaten the Malay hegemony.

To be fair, the political sophistication of this group has greatly contributed to the preservation of democracy in forms and some space for multiculturalism before the end of the Cold War.

In the aftermath of May 13, when the cry for a total Malay dominance was high, Tun Razak did not opt for a de jure one-party state and full ethnocracy.

In September 1971, he told Commonwealth parliamentarians his cynical view of democracy: “"The view we take is that democratic government is the best and most acceptable form of government. So long as the form is preserved, the substance can be changed to suit conditions of a particular country."

PAS after 1982 represents a vastly different model of “moderation” from Umno.

If Umno was conventionally restrictive on non-Muslims but relaxed on Muslims, PAS’s Islamisation has been largely the opposite, slowly attracting the non-Muslims but constantly alienating secular Muslims.

Politically, PAS has been affirming democracy in its vigorous fights against ISA since Reformasi and against electoral corruption since Bersih’s inception in 2006, making itself more inclusive.

Driven by the Erdogans, PAS has even replaced its exclusivist goal of Islamic state to the more universalist notion of “benevolent state”.  Now it even boldly defends the non-Muslims against far-right Muslim nationalists like Perkasa and Isma and even state religious authorities like MAIS and JAIS.

PAS however refuses to embrace secularism like the mainstream Islamist parties in Indonesia and Tunisia. Secularism is dismissed as a colonial legacy even by the Erdogans, who reject PAS hardliners’ agenda to implement hudud now but also insist that all Muslims must support hudud, leaving no room for debate.

In the end, PAS moderates’ frame of reference on communal relations and religious freedom is Turkey, not the contemporary republic under Prime Minister Erdogan, but the classic Caliphate of Ottorman.

The political necessity of excluding the non-minorities from hudud is offered through a modern version of the Ottorman’s millet system, where minorities were given segmental autonomy including different legal system.

However, that was a model employed by the conquering power on its subjugated minorities, not one of a nation-state consisting of equal citizens.

Are there multiculturalist nationalists?

Coming back to the 1946 question, if the albeit imperfect plural order of multiculturalism, democracy and secularism has been selectively rejected and undermined by different groups, are there any believers in an integrated nation-state consisting of equal citizens who can freely choose and mix their cultural, religious, linguistic identity?

Surely there are such individuals, but I cannot think of any well organised groups articulating such goal, not even from the ethnic minorities – whether Chinese, Indians or Borneans – who would rationally favour such an inclusive and diverse notion of nationhood.

Reacting to the assimilationist and discriminatory pressures by the state especially after 1969, most non-Malays withdraw to their own ghettos. They use language, culture and sometimes religion as the markers of ethnic boundaries, not unlike how Islam and the Malay language are used to culturally define and police the Malays.

It is almost a national sport now to lament the fast disappearance of the multicultural and moderate Malaysia we remember.

However, if the plural socio-political order – multiculturalism, multiparty democracy and secularism – as a whole has never really enjoyed legitimacy, but rather has been tolerated as a legacy that needs some kind of homogenisation, should we really be so surprised by the rise of far-right Muslim nationalism and the absence of a solid cross-ethnic defence of diversity? – July 9, 2014.

* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insider.